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Kobel's avatar

Disclosure up front: I build one of these things, so take this as a note on scope rather than a recommendation.

What strikes me about the list is that all twelve entries answer the same question — how does an organisation put a control plane in front of MCP servers its users share. Auth, credential isolation, tenant separation, audit: those criteria only make sense when there is more than one user and the gateway sits on a server.

The case that isn't represented is the single-user one. Someone runs Claude Desktop on their own laptop, points a filesystem MCP server at their home directory, and the entire permission model is one allowed-directory string. There is no tenant to isolate and no policy engine to configure — but the question "which of my files may this model change, and what did it actually do" is the same question, and the answers look completely different: per-file rather than per-directory, a local log rather than an observability stack, no server to operate.

Not a criticism of the comparison — the B2B multitenant frame is stated clearly. But if anyone is reading this hoping to solve the laptop case, none of the twelve will fit, and it might be worth saying so in a line.

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